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We present a crytographic protocol based upon entangled qutrit pairs. We analyse the scheme
under a symmetric incoherent attack and plot the region for which the protocol is secure and compare
this with the region of violations of certain Bell inequalities.
PACS numbers:
INTRODUCTION
The need to communicate secretly has always been an
important issue for military strategists during war time.
The one-time pad, first proposed by Vernam, has been
shown to be one of the most secure means of encrypting
a message provided the key is truly random and the key
is as long as the message [1]. However, a major problem
with the one-time pad is the establishment of a secure
key between the two physically separated parties with-
out the services of a courier. Recently, there has been a
major proposal to apply the laws of quantum mechanics
to establish this crucial key. This new proposal, called
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols, therefore
involves the use of quantum features such as uncertainty
principle or quantum correlations to establish a the neces-
sary key and hence provides unconditionally secure com-
munication.
The first Quantum Key Distribution was proposed by
Bennett and Brassard (BB84) in 1984 based on the fact
that any measurement on an unknown state of a po-
larized photon by a third party will always disturb the
state and hence detectable. An extension of the scheme
to three-dimensional quantum states has recently been
done [2] and it was shown to be more secure than two-
dimensional case. Another well-known variation of QKD
is based the idea of an entangled pair and detecting the
presence of the eavesdropper using violations of the Bell-
Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (Bell-CHSH) inequality [3].
This protocol (Ekert protocol) is fundamentally interest-
ing as it provides an example of how a fundamental prob-
lem in quantum mechanics, namely Bell-CHSH inequal-
ity and violation of local realism, can be applied to a
physical problem. Naturally, one questions if it is pos-
sible to extend this latter protocol involving Bell-CHSH
inequality to higher dimensional system.
The extension of Bell-CHSH inequality to higher di-
mensions is a non-trivial and interesting problem. As
higher dimensional quantum systems require much less
entanglement to be non-separable than two-dimensional
systems (qubits), it was suspected that higher dimen-
sional entangled systems may lead to stronger violations
of local realism. These results have been shown numer-
ically using linear optimization method by searching for
an underlying local realistic joint probability distribu-
tion that could reproduce the quantum predictions [4]
and confirmed analytically [5, 6].
CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY
The quantum channel we consider consists of a source
producing two qutrits [7], which we denote by A and B,
in the maximally entangled state |ψ〉 = 1√
3
∑2
k=0 |k〉A ⊗
|k〉B, where |k〉A and |k〉B are the k-th basis state of the
qutrit A and B respectively (these basis states can repre-
sent, for instance, spatial degrees of freedom of photons).
Qutrit A flies towards Alice whereas qutrit B flies to-
wards Bob. Each observer has at his or her disposal a
symmetric unbiased six-port beamsplitter.
FIG. 1: Qutrit Protocol
An unbiased symmetric six-port beamsplitter performs
a unitary transformation between ”mutually unbiased”
bases in the Hilbert space [8, 9, 10]. Such devices were
tested in several quantum optical experiments [11, 12],
and also various aspects of such devices were analyzed
theoretically [13, 14].
This quantum optical device has three input and three
output ports. In front of each input port there is a phase
shifter. When all the phase shifters are set to zero an
2incoming photon through one of the input ports has an
equal chance to leave the device through any of the out-
put ports. The elements of the unitary transformation,
which describes its action, are given by
Ukℓ =
1√
3
αkℓ eiϕℓ , (1)
where α = e2πi/3 and the indices k, ℓ (k, ℓ = 0, 1, 2) de-
note the input and exit ports respectively; ϕℓ are the
phase shifters. These phase shifters can be changed by
an observer. For convenience, we will denote the val-
ues of the three phase shifts in the form of a three di-
mensional vector ~ϕ = (ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3). In our protocol both
observers perform three distinct unitary transformations
on their qutrits. The transformations at Alice’s side are
defined by the following vectors of phases ~ϕA1 = (0, 0, 0),
~ϕA2 = (0,
π
3 ,−π3 ), ~ϕA3 = (π, 0,−π) whereas the transfor-
mations at Bob’s side are defined by ~ϕB1 = (0,
π
6 ,−π6 ),
~ϕB2 = (0,−π6 , π6 ), ~ϕB3 = (−π, 0, π). The observers choose
their transformations randomly and independently for
each pair of incoming qutrits. After performing the trans-
formation defined by the vectors of phases ~ϕAm, ~ϕ
B
n the
state |ψ〉 reads |ψ˜〉mn = UA(~ϕAm)⊗ UB(~ϕBn )|ψ〉. The ob-
servers perform the measurement of the state of the qutrit
in the basis in which |ψ〉 is defined, that is, |0〉x, |1〉x, |2〉x
(x = A,B). We have adopted an uncommon but useful
complex value assignment to the results of the measure-
ments, first used in [11]: namely, for the result of the
measurement of the ket |k〉x we ascribe the value αk.
This value assignment naturally leads to the following
definition of the correlation function Q(~ϕAk , ~ϕ
B
ℓ ) (Qkℓ for
short) between the values of Alice’s and Bob’s results of
measurements [11]
Qkℓ =
2∑
a,b=0
αa+b P (a, b; ~ϕAk , ~ϕ
B
ℓ ) , (2)
where P (a, b; ~ϕAk , ~ϕ
B
ℓ ) denotes the probability of obtain-
ing the result a by Alice and the result b by Bob for the
respective values of the phase shifts they have used. It
can be shown that the above correlation function reads
Qkℓ =
1
3
[
ei(ϕ
A
0
(k)−ϕA
1
(k)+ϕB
0
(ℓ)−ϕB
1
(ℓ)) + ei(ϕ
A
1
(k)−ϕA
2
(k)+ϕB
1
(ℓ)−ϕB
2
(ℓ)) + ei(ϕ
A
2
(k)−ϕA
0
(k)+ϕB
2
(ℓ)−ϕB
0
(ℓ))
]
, (3)
where, for instance, ϕA2 (k) denotes the second component
of the k-th vector of phases for Alice.
Note that Q33 = 1. This means that the results
of the measurement obtained by Alice and Bob are
strictly correlated. When Alice obtains the results
1, α, α2 Bob must register the results 1, α2, α respectively.
Thus, only the following pairs of the results are pos-
sible {(1, 1), (α, α2), (α2, α)} (denoted subsequently by
{(0, 0), (1, 2), (2, 1)}) and each pair of correlations occurs
with the same probability equal to 13 . Let us also define
the following quantity
S = Im(−α2Q11 + αQ12 + α2Q21 − α2Q22) . (4)
It can be shown [15], using the recently discovered Bell
inequality for two qutrits [16], that according to local
realistic theory S cannot exceed
√
3. However, when us-
ing the quantum mechanical correlation function (3), S
acquires the value 23 (2 +
√
3). Therefore, to violate the
above Bell inequality in this case one must reduce the cor-
relation function by the factor 6
√
3−9
2 (such reduction is
possible by adding the symmetric noise to the system).
It has been proved [17] that the above Bell inequality
gives necessary and sufficient conditions for local realism
in this case.
After the transmission has taken place, Alice and Bob
publicly announce the vectors of phase shifts that they
have chosen for each particular measurement and divide
the measurements into two separate groups: a first group
for which they have used the vectors ~ϕA1 , ~ϕ
A
2 and ~ϕ
B
1 , ~ϕ
B
2 ,
and a second group for which they have used ~ϕA3 , ~ϕ
B
3 .
Subsequently, Alice and Bob announce in public the re-
sults of the measurements they have obtained but only
within the first group. In this way they can compute
the value of S. If this value is not equal to 23 (2 +
√
3)
it means that the qutrits have somehow been disturbed.
The source of this disturbance can be either an eaves-
dropper or noise. In case of no disturbance the results
from the second group allow them, due to the mentioned
correlations, to generate a ternary cryptographic key.
For instance when Alice gets the sequence of values, say
(1, α, 1, α2, α2, 1, · · ·) then Bob must get the following se-
quence of results, (1, α2, 1, α, α, 1, · · ·).
EAVESDROPPING
Let us consider a symmetric incoherent attack in which
the eavesdropper (Eve) controls the source that produces
pairs of qutrits used by Alice and Bob to generate the
cryptographic key. Naturally, if Eve wants to acquire
any information about the key, she must introduce some
disturbance to the state of the qutrits. Her only chance
3of being undetected is to hide herself behind what, to
Alice and Bob, may look like an environmental noise in
the channel. We assume that the noise is symmetrical in
the sense that the correlation function in the presence of
it reads
Qnoise(~φ, ~ψ) = V Q(~φ, ~ψ), (5)
where 0 ≤ V ≤ 1. This requirement can only be fulfilled
if the reduced state for Alice and Bob (after tracing out
Eve’s degrees of freedom) is of the form
̺AB = A|ψ〉〈ψ|+B|χ1〉〈χ1|+C|χ2〉〈χ2|+ D
9
I ⊗ I, (6)
where the real (not necessarily all positive) numbers A+
B + C + D = 1, and where the maximally entangled
orthogonal states |χk〉 (k = 1, 2) read
|χ1〉 = 1√
3
(|00〉+ α|11〉+ α2|22〉)
|χ2〉 = 1√
3
(|00〉+ α2|11〉+ α|22〉). (7)
This choice of states stems from the fact that only the
above states generate correlation functions that are pro-
portional to Q(~φ, ~ψ). To be more specific, the state |χ1〉
gives the correlation function αQ(~φ, ~ψ) whereas the state
|χ2〉 gives the correlation function α2Q(~φ, ~ψ). Thus, if
we compute the correlation function on the state ̺AB,
we arrive at the following formula
Qnoise(~φ, ~ψ) = AQ(~φ, ~ψ) + αBQ(~φ, ~ψ) + α
2CQ(~φ, ~ψ)
= (A+ αB + α2C)Q(~φ, ~ψ). (8)
From Eq.(5), we obtain the condition A+αB+α2C = V ,
which is only possible if B = C (V is real).
Eve can prepare the reduced density operator (6) by
preparing an entangled state of the form,
|ψABE〉 =
√
F
3
(|00〉|E00〉+ |11〉|E11〉+ |22〉|E22〉)
+
√
G
6
(|01〉|E01〉+ |10〉|E10〉+ |20〉|E20〉
+|02〉|E20〉+ |12〉|E12〉+ |21〉|E21〉), (9)
where {|kl〉} are the computational basis states of the two
qutrits, and {|Ekl〉} are states of ancilla. Without loss
of generality, we can assume that they are normalized
(which implies that F +G = 1). Note that the most gen-
eral state of the joint system of Alice’s and Bob’s qutrits
and Eve’s ancilla reads
∑2
kl=0 |kl〉|Ekl〉. However, Eq. (6)
and the requirement that ̺AB = TrE(|ψABE〉〈ψABE |)
imposes the following conditions on the states of the an-
cilla
F 〈Ekk|Ell〉 = A−B
〈Ekl|Emn〉 = δkl, k 6= l, (10)
Denoting 〈Ekk |Ell〉 by λ we arrive at the following set of
conditions
A+ 2B +D = 1
A−B = Fλ
D =
3
2
(1 − F ). (11)
Eve’s strategy is the following. She prepares the state
(9), sends the qutrits to Alice and Bob and keeps her an-
cilla. She then waits for public communication between
Alice and Bob. When the settings of Alice’s and Bob’s
apparatus (phase shifts) are revealed, Eve adopts the fol-
lowing algorithm: (i) If the chosen settings are not the
ones used for the key generation she ignores the ancilla;
(ii) If the settings are the ones for which the key is gen-
erated, i.e., ~ϕA3 , ~ϕ
B
3 , she identifies the ancilla state.
Let us first find the transformed state in case (ii), i.e.,
the state |ψ˜ABE〉 = UA(~ϕA3 ) ⊗ UB(~ϕB3 ) ⊗ I|ψABE〉. A
straightforward computation yields
|ψ˜ABE〉 =
2∑
a,b=0
|ab〉|E˜ab〉, (12)
where the un-normalized states |E˜ab〉 read
|E˜ab〉 = 1
3
(√
F
3
2∑
k=0
α(a+b)kei(ϕ
A
k
(3)+ϕB
k
(3))|Ekk〉
+
√
G
6
∑
m 6=n
αam+bnei(ϕ
A
m
(3)+ϕB
n
(3))|Emn〉
)
(13)
Note that (12) can also be written more conveniently as
|ψ˜ABE〉 =
(
|00〉|E˜00〉+ |12〉|E˜12〉+ |21〉|E˜21〉
)
+
(
|11〉|E˜11〉+ |20〉|E˜20〉+ |02〉|E˜02〉
)
+
(
|22〉|E˜22〉+ |10〉|E˜10〉+ |01〉|E˜01〉
)
, (14)
4where we have grouped the terms into three orthogonal
subspaces associated with Alice and Bob generating the
correct key {(0, 0), (1, 2), (2, 1)}, and the two incorrect
keys, {(1, 1), (2, 0), (0, 2)} or {(2, 2), (1, 0), (0, 1)}. Note
also that the ancilla states of one subspace are orthogonal
to the ancilla states of the other subspaces.
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FIG. 2: The optimal three-state discrimination procedure for
states in the first subspace. The angle between each of the
states is α = arccos λ˜1.
The probability that Eve projects into the sub-
spaces spanned by the states {|E˜00〉, |E˜12〉, |E˜21〉},
{|E11〉, |E20〉, |E02〉} and {|E22〉, |E10〉, |E01〉} are
P0 = 3〈E˜00|E˜00〉 = 1 + 2Fλ
3
P1 = 3〈E˜11|E˜11〉 = 1− Fλ
3
P2 = 3〈E˜22|E˜22〉 = 1− Fλ
3
, (15)
respectively. We have considered the fact that the states
within each bracket in Eq.(14) have the same norms with
the same mutual scalar products. Moreover, these scalar
products are all real.
Eve now has to determine the state of her ancilla, given
that Alice and Bob have projected the whole state into
one of three subspaces associated with the three cases.
These subspaces are orthogonal so that Eve can, in prin-
ciple, determine without error, which of these cases Alice
and Bob have.
The three ancilla vectors in each subspace correspond-
ing to the result obtained by Alice and Bob are symmetric
and equiprobable. This makes Eve’s task of discrimina-
tion easier as this case has an analytic optimal solution
[18] using the so-called “square-root measurement”. We
define the operator Φ =
∑
ab |E˜ab〉〈E˜ab|, where {|E˜ab〉}
are the ancilla states spanning the subspace associated
with Alice and Bob’s measurement outcomes. Since we
are discriminating 3 vectors in a 3-dimensional space, the
optimum measurement directions, |ωab〉 = Φ− 12 |E˜ab〉 are
orthogonal, hence Eve simply performs a projective mea-
surement on her ancilla (Fig. 2).
FIG. 3: Three Dimensional Plots of the Error Rates
Thus, Eve’s error rate is given by
EEve =
3∑
i=0
Pi(1 −Wi) (16)
whereWi, (i = 1, 2, 3) is the probability of correctly iden-
tifying the three states of the ancilla in the i-th subspace.
These probabilities are given by
Wi =
(
1
3
√
1 + 2λ˜i +
2
3
√
1− λ˜i
)2
(17)
where
λ˜1 =
1
2
3F + 4Fλ− 1
1 + 2Fλ
(18)
λ˜2 =
1
2
3F − 2Fλ− 1
1− Fλ
= λ˜3 (19)
Due to the symmetry of the noise introduced by Eve,
the error rate between Alice and Bob determined using
Eq.(6) and the conditions in Eq.(11) is
EAB = 2(1− Fλ)
3
(20)
We also note that whenever Eve eavesdrops, the corre-
lation function obtained by Alice and Bob is reduced by
Fλ. Therefore, if this factor is less than 6
√
3−9
2 , the Bell
inequality is not violated [5] and so Alice and Bob will
abort the protocol. This implies that Eve must keep this
factor above this value.
Fig.3 shows the three dimensional plots of the error
rates of Eve as a function of the parameters F and λ
(labeled by surface I) as well as the error rate between
Alice and Bob (labeled by surface II). The region in which
the factor Fλ is greater than the threshold value (V0 =
(6
√
3 − 9)/2) is demarcated by the “wall” labeled C. In
5the region bounded by Fλ ≥ V0, the error rate of Eve
is always greater than the error rate between Alice and
Bob.
An alternative approach to test the security of the pro-
tocol against such incoherent symmetric attack is to con-
sider the mutual information between Alice and Eve and
compare it with the mutual information between Alice
and Bob. The mutual information between Alice and
Eve is given by the following expression
IAE = H(A) +H(E)−H(A;E)
= log 3− 3〈E˜00|E˜00〉 log〈E˜00|E˜00〉 − 6〈E˜11|E˜11〉 log〈E˜11|E˜11〉
−
[
− 3〈E˜00|E˜00〉W1 log
(
〈E˜00|E˜00〉W1
)
− 6〈E˜00|E˜00〉(1−W1)2 log
(
〈E˜00|E˜00〉(1−W1)2
)
−6〈E˜11|E˜11〉W2 log
(
〈E˜11|E˜11〉W2
)
− 12〈E˜11|E˜11〉(1−W2)2 log
(
〈E˜11|E˜11〉(1−W2)2
)]
, (21)
where H is the Shannon entropy. The mutual information between Alice and Bob is
IAE = 2 log 3 +
1
3
(1 + Fλ) {log (1 + Fλ)− log 9}+ 2
3
(1− Fλ) {log (1− Fλ)− log 9} . (22)
Fig. 4 shows the plan elevation of the 3-dimensional plots
of the mutual information as a function of the parameters
F and λ. The line of intersection between IAE and IAB
clearly lies behind the wall separating the region in which
the Bell inequality is violated from the region (R1) in
which local realistic description is possible (R2). In the
region R1, IAB > IAE. From numerical calculation, the
maximum value of V for which Eve’s mutual information
equals Alice and Bob’s is 0.6629. Thus, Alice and Bob
have a buffer region in which to operate securely from
this kind of attack by Eve.
To summarize, we have presented a cryptographic pro-
tocol using qutrits which is resistant to a form of sym-
metric, incoherent attacks. The qutrit Bell inequality
provides a sufficient condition for secure communication.
However, this attack may not be optimal so the Bell in-
equality may prove to be necessary.
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